



## Human Dignity in Genetics and Reproductive Health in the Digital Age

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### Abstract

The innovation in the digital age has had a significant impact on the field of reproductive health as well as genetics alongside other knotty issues concerning human dignity. The bringing together of genetics, reproductive health, and digital technologies threatens human dignity from the angle of data security breaches, possible exploitation, and erosion of trust through false information and its related constraints. This multidisciplinary examination attempted to analyse the fundamental interaction among genetics, reproductive health, and human dignity from the position of the sophistication in the digital age as well as possible strategies for ensuring the preservation of human dignity. Through a qualitative approach of conceptual and critical analysis, the study found that digital technologies can both promote and undermine human dignity bringing about a moral dilemma with a need for balanced critical analysis of concepts and applications. The study's significance lies in the view that technology determines the trajectory of the rules of engagement in the comity of humans and even medical practice with the imperative of prioritising human dignity in the development and use of genetic and reproductive health technologies. The main finding of the study is that human dignity can be enabled by progress in genetics and reproductive health with the possibility of abuse as well. Hence, the study concludes by emphasizing the need to protect individual personal autonomy, privacy, and dignity with actionable recommendations.

Keywords: Individual Autonomy, Human Dignity, Digital Age, Genetics, Reproductive Health

### Introduction

In the fast-changing field of genetics and reproductive health, the concept of human dignity faces new challenges due to digital technology. With recent advances, the integration of digital technology into genetics and reproductive health has enabled remarkable innovations such as CRISPR-Cas9, gene editing, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD), Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer (SCNT), Genomic Data and Biobanking and gene therapy. Scientists are now able to modify genes thereby improving health and providing new options for family planning<sup>1</sup>. However, these advancements raise ethical questions about how we define and protect human dignity. These digital health technologies raise concerns about privacy, personal choice, and informed consent in reproductive health. While human dignity refers to the

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intrinsic value of every person, the principle of human dignity is crucial for creating a just society where individual rights are understood and respected.

The capacity to select, alter, and engineer the genetic blueprint of human life has shifted from theoretical

possibility to clinical practice. It is opined that "The history of human civilization is the history of ideas. Ideas are mental constructs some of which comes intuitively but with far reaching implications for human development and progress"<sup>2</sup>. Simultaneously, the digitisation of health data, algorithmic medical decisions, and the expanding use of artificial intelligence in reproductive technologies have reconfigured what it means to be human, to reproduce, and to be protected by rights. At the base of these advances lie a critical normative concern which is the protection of human dignity amid biomedical innovation. Human dignity, being neither static nor universally defined has become both a shield and a contested terrain in debates over genetic selection, reproductive autonomy, and digital surveillance in healthcare. Even though human dignity, as expressed in bioethics and legal discourse, has historically served as a restraint on biotechnological excesses, in reproductive genetics, dignity must now be interrogated not only as a limit but also as a locus of empowerment. It has been observed that reproductive technologies raise unique dignity concerns because they "directly implicate the foundational elements of identity and bodily integrity"<sup>3</sup>. Technologies such as preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), germline editing, and artificial wombs fundamentally alter the relationship between individuals and their reproductive futures as they enhance choice, but also introduce risks of coercion and market commodification.

This dialectic is intensified in the digital era, where data from genomic sequencing, fertility tracking apps, and AI-driven embryo selection are integrated into cloud-based environments. The caution however is that, when life sciences converge with digital systems, the individual is increasingly treated "not as an end in itself but as a set of manipulable variables"<sup>4</sup>. The concern is not merely technical misuse or privacy breaches but the reconstitution of human beings as programmable entities. In such a system, dignity is no longer assumed but must be actively defended against processes that depersonalize reproduction or subordinate care to computational logic. A significant strain arises in the discourse between technological determinism and ethical autonomy where genetic and reproductive technologies are often adopted under the banner of progress; but this layer can obscure the absence of

meaningful informed consent. In contexts where data literacy is low and AI systems are blur, patients may unknowingly relinquish control over decisions fundamental to their lives. It is explained that, "informed consent may become performative rather than substantive when embedded in digital health infrastructures that obscure the moral weight of choice"<sup>5</sup>. Consent, in such scenarios, is less a practice of freedom than a procedural checkbox in an algorithmic workflow as it may be linked to the sanctity of life or social cohesion. For example, the Oviedo Convention defines human dignity as inviolable and non-negotiable, particularly in matters involving the human genome. By contrast, international human rights law while affirming dignity leaves its interpretation more open-ended, thereby enabling contested applications in genetic and reproductive policy<sup>6</sup>.

Despite these complexities, the human rights tradition from traditional sources offer a platform for restoring ethical clarity. The principle of dignity is also enshrined in the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, which affirms that "the interests and welfare of the individual should have priority over the sole interest of science or society". While critics have argued that such declarations lack enforcement, they still remain vital normative touchstones in resisting dehumanizing practices. As emphasized by some scholars, "reproductive rights must be integrated into a comprehensive dignity-based approach that includes legal protection, social support, and access to meaningful participation in reproductive decisions"<sup>7</sup>. This understanding will steer the trajectory of this study while focusing on creating a new consciousness in deploying technology towards respect for human dignity.

## Conceptual Clarifications

### 1) Genetics

Genetics is broadly defined as the scientific study of heredity, emphasizing genes and the various factors that influence their expression and transmission<sup>8</sup>. It is also described as the biology of heredity, focusing on the biochemical instructions that carry genetic information from one generation to the next. The term genetics was first used by William Bateson back in 1905 to talk about heredity and variation. To really grasp how genetic info works, it helps to know basic concepts like DNA, genes, chromosomes,

alleles, genotype, phenotype, dominant and recessive alleles, and mutations. Techniques like polygenic risk scores, genome-wide studies, and AI-based embryo selection all come with predictions that need careful thought from both doctors and parents. These predictions are however about probabilities, not certainties. For example, deciding against embryos with a low risk of schizophrenia could mean missing out on children who might have had great lives. Genetics is not just about the parents or the patient anymore but involves the child who has not even been born yet. Their identity is affected by choices made long before they arrive, based on data that might be understood differently down the road. Dignity in this scenario stretches beyond just the living creating a long-term ethical duty.

## 2) Reproductive Health

The concept of reproductive health has moved from a narrow focus on maternal and child survival and family planning to a more holistic context that includes physical, mental and social well-being in all aspects related to the reproductive system. This perspective emphasizes that reproductive health is not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. Rather, it is a state in which individuals can enjoy a satisfying and safe sex life, possess the capability to reproduce, and have the autonomy to decide if, when, and how often to do so.

## 3) Digital Age

Human “engagements with being, reality and its constituents part”<sup>9</sup> has been the driver of civilization. Hence, the term “digital age” refers not merely to the presence of computers or internet connectivity, but to a deeper transformation in how knowledge, power, and identity are constructed. In healthcare and biomedicine, the digital age marks a shift from analog clinical judgments to data-driven protocols. In reproductive and genetic domains, this has enabled personalised medicine, genomic sequencing, and automated decision-making tools. The digital age has been defined in biotechnologies as “a phase where human life is increasingly mapped, mediated, and even pre-empted by digital infrastructures”<sup>10</sup>. This includes biometric surveillance, real-time health monitoring, and AI-based health predictions all of which extend biomedical authority into previously personal or

intimate domains.

## 4) Human Dignity

Human dignity suffers from definitional pluralism. Historically rooted in Kantian philosophy, dignity refers to the intrinsic worth of every individual as a rational moral agent. From this view, dignity is violated when persons are treated merely as means rather than ends. In reproductive and genetic technologies, this means safeguarding individuals from instrumental use such as exploiting egg donors or using embryos for experimentation without consent so that, “human dignity functions constitutionally as both a right and a limit to rights, shaping how technologies may serve or distort human flourishing”<sup>11</sup>.

## Research Questions

These questions are intended to assist in directing the arguments of the study viz:

- i. In what ways do genetic and reproductive technologies in the digital era impact the conceptual understanding of human dignity?
- ii. In what ways do information and computer technology influence freedom, privacy, and control in making decisions regarding reproduction and genetics?
- iii. What are the most appropriate ethical approaches, particularly those derived from human dignity, to use in assessing new reproductive health and genetic technologies?
- iv. How can an approach to interpreting and understanding things disclose the underlying moral assumptions and social-political power structures embedded in technology use?
- v. What are some practical and good means of safeguarding human dignity as reproduction and genetics go digital?

## Methodological Framework

This study adopts a qualitative philosophical methodology which integrates critical conceptual review and analysis. This enables a layered interrogation of meanings, assumptions, and implications underlying the use of digital technologies in genetics and reproductive health. The choice of the methodology aligns with the study’s normative objectives of ethics as a discipline concerned with human meaning, values, and

responsibility. Conceptual analysis is employed to clarify and interrogate key terms such as human dignity, autonomy, reproductive freedom, genetic risk, and digital surveillance. This approach allows the study to examine how these terms are used in different ethical, legal, and scientific contexts, and how such uses impact normative reasoning. This study investigates therefore, how the term dignity functions both as an ethical compass and as a contested rhetorical device in genetic and reproductive debates. For example, different conceptualizations of dignity as inherent worth, relational respect, or state-imposed norm produce distinct moral and policy outcomes. Conceptual analysis also supports normative positioning: not only in mapping debates but taking a justified stance within them.

### Literature Review

Digital technology, genetics, and reproductive health spans within the concerns of bioethics, law, and sociology. Human dignity is a central issue in bioethical discourse but its unclear meaning usually advances disputes. It is explained that in reproductive technologies, “dignity serves both as a protective concept guarding against commodification and as an empowering one that upholds reproductive autonomy”<sup>12</sup> Focus is also made on human germline modification with the point that “dignity in international human rights law has a stabilizing function but does not resolve interpretive conflicts across ethical traditions”<sup>13</sup>. There is a critical issue which is the use of dignity in legal frameworks often lagging behind the technological realities they are meant to regulate. A scholar identifies dignity as a unifying but politically contested norm as it “invoked to resist commodification, but also to defend procreative liberty”<sup>14</sup>. This statement demonstrates that dignity is increasingly caught between liberal and communitarian readings, which either emphasize autonomy or the moral integrity of the species. While these works explore the conceptual flexibility of dignity, they rarely examine how digital systems and algorithmic governance rewrite dignity not just its application.

A legal-ethical analysis of digital technologies in reproductive health and genetics has been offered with a focus on disability rights emphasizing the risk

of discriminatory profiling, especially when predictive analytics are embedded in reproductive decisions. This points to the fact that, “digital data flows...magnify pre-existing biases under the guise of clinical neutrality”<sup>15</sup>. This is especially important for linking bioethics with digital justice while privacy concerns in reproductive platforms is noted with the observation that “assisted reproductive technologies increasingly operate through opaque data-sharing arrangements that compromise consent”<sup>16</sup>. A broader philosophical view warns that the digital management of reproduction via algorithms, genetic databases, and biometric prediction “produces a techno-legal matrix that governs individuals without transparent ethical oversight”<sup>17</sup>. This critique is compelling but abstract and lacking actionable proposals for rehumanizing these infrastructures. These positions rightly emphasize privacy and bias, but often understate the ontological shift brought by digitalization which has to do with how these technologies change the very nature of being a reproductive subject.

To this end, multiple scholars have drawn attention to the stratifying effects of genetic technologies with one coining the term “reproductive stratification” to describe how access to IVF, PGD, and egg freezing reflects and reproduces global inequalities; stating that, “the privileged can outsource risk and labour, while the marginalized become raw material for reproductive markets”<sup>18</sup>. This foreground structural injustice in the application of genetic tools. Again, how constitutional law frames dignity in genetic contexts is considered such that, “rights are often unevenly distributed when technological access is mediated by market logic”<sup>19</sup>. Here, dignity protections in law too often assume a level playing field that does not exist. Meanwhile, there is a critique that the moral minimalism of many bioethical frameworks holds that, “the concept of dignity is frequently invoked in genetic ethics, but rarely examined for its material implications in real-world practices”<sup>20</sup>. This results in superficial appeals to dignity that do little to challenge eugenic or ableist tendencies in gene editing and screening. These works critique inequality yet stop short of examining how predictive data regimes grounded in genetics alter dignity.

The liberal ideal of reproductive choice central to bioethical frameworks is increasingly posing a

problem by new technologies with some scholars defending a robust conception of procreative liberty, asserting that “dignity lies in the ability to make informed reproductive decisions free from coercion”<sup>21</sup>. A scholar has a different view on unlimited options believing that dignity should have limits to the extent that “there is a kind of dignity that lies in restraint from redesigning ourselves at the cost of our naturalness”<sup>22</sup>. Again, dignity is connected with humility and the integrity of our species, which has made an impact in conservative bioethics. From a feminist angle, while these technologies may offer more choices, they also create new challenges such as financial, emotional, and social that are not shared equally<sup>23</sup>. Discussions around policy should therefore address these real-life inequalities, rather than just theoretical freedoms. Instead of treating autonomy and dignity as separate or opposing ideas, this study suggests a more connected approach where dignity is not just an individual concept but is realized through our social and technological interactions. It also faults “choice” when that choice is shaped by AI recommendations or institutional pressure.

Several scholars have proposed ways to reconcile conflicting bioethical values advocating<sup>24</sup> for a capabilities-based approach to dignity in reproductive contexts, incorporating social support and structural access not just formal rights. This perspective expands the scope of bioethics toward justice. Others proposes<sup>25</sup> a tiered ethics model where dignity functions as both threshold and aspiration with minimum protections plus aspirational ideals. This model is conceptually useful but underdeveloped in practical terms, especially in the face of digitized health environments. There is also the idea of “genetic dilemmas” situations where ethical clarity collapses due to predictive uncertainty and institutional complexity suggesting that bioethics must adapt to a world where “parents and physicians are asked to make decisions in the absence of firm outcomes”<sup>26</sup>. While these models aim for balance, they often fail to concretely map dignity into the technical and institutional processes through which technologies operate. This is where the study builds a bridge between normative frameworks and the practical architectures of digital genetics and reproduction seeking how dignity can be encoded, not just

espoused.

### **The Ambivalence of Genetics**

Genetics has been celebrated as a diagnostic and therapeutic frontier, but now occupies a contested moral space where empowerment and control unite. As gene-editing technologies like CRISPR advance, the ethical implications have grown more complexed which is no longer reducible to binary categories of good or evil. Instead, genetics today functions as a double-edged instrument capable of enabling individual autonomy while at the same time, reproduce new forms of moral pressure, social diversities and technological pressure. One of the dominant ethical arguments in favour of genetic technologies is their potential to enhance individual autonomy. Gene editing for therapeutic purposes such as the correction of monogenic disorders like sickle cell anaemia can be framed as a restoration of dignity by relieving suffering and enabling healthy living. Some scholars maintain that genetic enhancement, when pursued to eliminate disease or increase well-being, affirms human dignity by promoting choice and reducing suffering. The moral imperative, they argue, “is not to preserve the genome, but to improve lives through responsible intervention”<sup>27</sup>.

Such arguments are compelling in cases of severe genetic illness, where dignity may be compromised by chronic pain, disability, or early mortality. In these instances, the right to not be genetically modified can clash with the right to be modified to live a life free from suffering. CRISPR-based somatic editing, when medically indicated and consensual, fits well within dignity-oriented frameworks grounded in autonomy. However, this view rests on the assumption that individuals operate within free and informed conditions. However, it was countered on the grounds that “the expansion of genetic editing into the realm of reproduction opens new avenues for coercion masked as consent”<sup>28</sup>. The expansion of genetic tools into reproductive domains particularly heritable genome editing revives fears of eugenics in a technologically sophisticated form. It is argued that “reproductive technologies, most of which have been accompanied by fears of eugenics, the loss of human dignity, and control over future generations, must be evaluated not just on their safety, but on what they normalize

about human worth"<sup>29</sup>. There is a troubling trend which is the return of eugenic logics under the guise of "responsible parenting" or "informed choice." This shift is evident in the rise of embryo screening and polygenic scoring, where parents are offered statistical predictions about intelligence, height, or risk for mental illness. While marketed as tools for empowerment, these technologies implicitly rank lives on a scale of desirability.

It is held that dignity "cannot be preserved where genetic value judgments are permitted to shape legal identity or social legitimacy"<sup>30</sup>. Policies often lag behind market developments, and regulatory clarity around germline editing which remains elusive in many jurisdictions. The result is a growing disparity between what is technically possible and what is ethically permissible. In liberal bioethics, reproductive freedom is often treated as a sacrosanct value. The right to choose whether, when, and how to reproduce forms the backbone of much pro-technology rhetoric. However, the context in which choices are made is often neglected with some scholars pointing out that, "decisions made within an infrastructure of digital prediction and commercialized reproduction are not simply expressions of autonomy but are often responses to institutional pressures"<sup>31</sup>.

For instance, women invited to undergo the cryopreservation of oocytes to facilitate professional mobility might be subjected to tacit cultural pressures rather than expressing authentic autonomy. Equally, potential parents who choose embryos on the basis of polygenic risk scores may be responding to disability anxieties in society rather than conforming to personal conviction. In such cases, the illusion of choice clouds an intrinsic lack of ethical autonomy, which should be based on profound deliberation rather than algorithmic suggestions. Irony ensues, as genetic technologies intended to increase choices actually limit them by making certain choices, that is, giving birth to a child with Down syndrome appear irresponsible. This phenomenon is termed "genetic responsibility,"<sup>32</sup> which recasts parents as moral agents not just because of love or care but also as agents who take it upon themselves to follow biomedical reason. In this context, dignity is not an essential attribute but a feature to be achieved by conforming to technological norms while predictive genomics

introduces a new temporal element into dignity debates.

Methods like polygenic risk scores, genome-wide association studies, and AI-assisted embryo selection provide probabilities that raise ethical questions for both doctors and parents. For example, acting on a low risk score for schizophrenia could mean choosing not to use certain embryos that might have had happy lives. This raises the question of when does predicting something turn into acting on it before it happens? Genetics therefore, is not just about the parents or the patients anymore but about the future child as well. Their identity is influenced by choices made even before they are born, based on data that might be viewed differently down the line. So, the idea of dignity here goes beyond the now and involves a lasting ethical responsibility across generations. What emerges from this analysis is not a clear verdict for or against genetic technologies, but an acknowledgment of their moral ambivalence. They can enhance dignity and undermine it sometimes at the same time just as they offer freedom and impose expectation. This duality is not a flaw in the technology alone but in the normative frameworks that guide its use. Hence, it is proposed that ethics must move beyond regulatory checklists and toward "a phenomenological understanding of technology's effects on our being-in-the-world"<sup>33</sup>. In other words, bioethics must reckon not only with outcomes but with the kind of humans and human societies these technologies invite us to become.

### **Reproductive Health and Human Fulfilment**

The pursuit of human fulfilment through reproductive health aligns with questions of dignity, autonomy, and justice. In the digital age, the ethical boundaries around assisted reproduction, access, data surveillance, and techno-clinical decision-making expose tensions between reproductive freedom and structural inequalities. The promise of fulfilment is offered and sometimes denied through reproductive health systems shaped by digital tools and biopolitical agendas. Beyond biological function, reproductive health also encapsulates the moral liberty to personal purpose, physical autonomy, as well as relational continuity. This goes beyond parenting to also reflect a pursuit of value and recognition with the emphasis that, "reproductive health and rights are not mere

aspirations but foundational to bodily autonomy and human dignity, especially in a digitalized environment where consent and control over one's data are persistently challenged<sup>34</sup>. This emphasis on the erosion of agency in digital systems brings to the fore the ethical paradox of "choice" within reproductive stands governed by blur algorithms.

However, fulfilment is not only obstructed by digital intrusion but also shaped by cultural norms embedded within biomedical paradigms. There is the representation of reproductive technologies, which are commonly hailed as freeing, but often continue to entrench gendered vulnerabilities to the extent that, "The freedom to choose is accompanied by subtle coercions clinical expectations, familial pressure, and social ideals of the 'good life'<sup>35</sup>. When assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) become commodified, the ideal of autonomy can become a performative event, reserved for those who can afford it or have access to technological reproduction, normally through market-driven channels. Thus, the commodification of fertility erodes both the bodily existence and the moral right to human dignity.

The process of fragmentation is compounded in the conditions of transnational surrogacy and internet-based sperm banking systems, where women's reproductive bodies become conduits for distant bio-capital. A scholar clarifies this point by stating that "technologically mediated reproduction introduces new hierarchies in whose autonomy is recognised, whose consent is valorised, and whose fulfilment matters"<sup>36</sup>. The unequal valuation of reproductive lives puts forward some important questions about the universality of reproductive dignity in a digital health economy that distinguishes access based on class, race, and geography. The concept of fulfilment in the field of reproductive ethics is often expressed only with respect to individual want, specifically the desire for either genetic or gestational parenthood. But such a view could conceal other legitimate expressions of reproductive flourishing, such as non-genetic parenthood, voluntary childlessness, or the creation of queer family formations.

For instance, fertility tracking apps marketed to cisgender women often reinforce heteronormative, procreative scripts, leaving queer, trans, and disabled users underrepresented or misdiagnosed. A scholar cautions against the over-reliance on tech-mediated

autonomy, stating that, "When dignity is interpreted only as rational, data-driven decision-making, it marginalises those whose fulfilment is not reducible to technological success"<sup>37</sup>. Fulfilment must thus, remain ethically plural open to different ways of being, choosing, and creating family. This ethical plurality challenges one-size-fits-all legal frameworks and demands attention to lived realities. To this end, fulfilment ought to be both existential and structural as it refers not only to outcomes (such as successful conception) but to the moral conditions under which those outcomes become possible or desirable.

At the same time, fulfilment must not be framed as entitlement to children which is why it is explained that, "the pursuit of motherhood, while ethically significant, cannot eclipse competing rights such as the dignity and freedom of potential co-parents, surrogates, or future children"<sup>38</sup>. The relationality of reproduction calls for a balance of interests, not a singular focus on desire. The interplay between fulfilment and autonomy must also be critically reviewed in the light of care ethics. It is suggested by some scholars that "bioethical principles that elevate autonomy above all else risk ignoring the relational, affective, and bodily aspects of childbirth and reproductive decision-making"<sup>39</sup>. Autonomy, in this sense, becomes too abstract when severed from care, empathy, and human vulnerability since reproductive dignity includes the right to not know, to refuse intervention, or to be held in uncertainty not only the right to choose according to algorithmic certainty.

Such an expanded view of dignity is supported by traditions in feminist and relational bioethics that place care, interdependence, and embodied subjectivity at the centre of moral reasoning. Fulfilment, therefore, cannot be extracted from care structures such as clinical, familial, and societal that shape how decisions are made, supported, and lived through. A focus on fulfilment also necessitates examining post-reproductive dignity, especially in cases where ARTs fail or are withdrawn. The emotional aftermath of IVF failure, surrogacy breakdowns, or age-related infertility often remains ethically unaddressed in techno-centric reproductive discourse. When dignity is only attached to successful conception, the psychosocial realities of reproductive loss become ethically invisible.

However, “many patients leave reproductive clinics with no child, no plan, and no support, having been reduced to their fertility potential in a data system that now discards them”<sup>40</sup>. A dignity-based model must attend to this “exit experience,” while preserving self-worth even when reproductive outcomes fall short of clinical success.

Moreover, reproductive fulfilment cannot be ethically pursued without confronting intersectionality such that, “structural racism limits reproductive freedom not only through direct prohibition but through unequal healthcare, environmental toxicity, and the devaluation of non-white parenthood”<sup>41</sup>. Digital reproductive platforms, which often cater to affluent, white, heterosexual users, aggravate these exclusions by designing interfaces and services around normative assumptions. Consequently, true fulfilment demands not just access to services, but access to recognition to be seen, supported, and valued within one’s reproductive choices. Digital innovation, while promising in efficiency, also opens new forms of reproductive challenge. For instance, AI-based embryo selection may optimize implantation probabilities, but at what moral cost? Embryos flagged as suboptimal based on blur data models may be discarded or deprioritized, reinforcing ableist and perfectionist norms. Fulfilment under such systems, becomes a technological negotiation rather than a personal or moral journey making a scholar to warn that, “reproductive AI doesn’t merely predict; it instructs, steering clinical decision-making and subtly limiting choice under the illusion of optimization”<sup>42</sup>. Thus, human dignity requires a recalibration of technology’s authority over deeply human processes.

### **Human Dignity and the Digital Technology Divide**

In reproductive health, the mix of digital technology and structural inequality introduces new ethical pressures that compromise human dignity. While digital platforms, AI-based diagnostics, and algorithmic surveillance increasingly mediate access to reproductive services, disparities in digital literacy, infrastructure, and cultural accessibility have generated a multidimensional “digital technology divide.” This divide does not merely separate those who have access from those who do

not but also separates those who are seen and valued from those who are monitored, scored, or excluded. In such contexts, dignity is not only threatened by absence but by the terms of inclusion.

The World Health Organization notes that “such a digital divide not only limits use of AI in low- and middle-income countries but exacerbates historical inequalities in who benefits from innovation”<sup>43</sup>. The implication here is profound: when access to digital health is uneven, so is access to personhood in the clinical gaze. Those without connectivity, literacy, or financial means remain outside not only of services but also of data systems that frame whose lives are counted and whose bodies are mapped. Importantly, the divide is not just geographic or economic but also epistemic. A scholar observes that “global health ethics has historically privileged Euro-American biomedical frameworks, often silencing local narratives, especially in reproductive justice movements”<sup>44</sup>.

Digital tools in reproductive care often promise empowerment through monitoring. However, this promise is deeply conditional just as a scholar criticises FemTech platforms, arguing that “while they may empower certain users to manage their reproductive health, they also risk becoming FEM-TRAPS, sites of gendered surveillance and commodified intimacy”<sup>45</sup>. What appears as choice may in fact function as pressure, particularly when digital reproductive systems reward regular tracking and punish deviation with less access or increased cost. The language of empowerment thus risks concealing coercion. A woman using a cycle-tracking app may believe she is in control, yet if the app sells her data or recommends hormonal treatments based on commercial partnerships, her autonomy is quietly compromised. In such environments, dignity is not destroyed through violence but eroded through design.

This erosion is especially stark in contexts where biometric data are used to prioritize patients. A scholar frames this process as bio-precariousness, warning that “digital infrastructures in public health increasingly distribute dignity based on compliance and traceability rather than moral equality”<sup>46</sup>. In other words, those who fit the data models are supported; those who do not are problematized. Such selective visibility transforms reproductive subjects into algorithmic identities, managed not through



dialogue but through prediction and pre-emption. These risks are magnified by the commercial imperatives behind most digital health platforms. A scholar points out that “the digitalization of reproductive services has led to increased surveillance, discrimination, and the erosion of privacy, especially for marginalized users”<sup>47</sup>. What is framed as convenience is often implemented as extraction from intimate data to behavioural metadata which can later be used for profiling, advertising, or even denying insurance.

Surveillance in reproductive care also reshapes the meaning of responsibility just as a scholar warns that “digital medicine encourages self-surveillance as an ethical norm, shifting the burden of reproductive success and failure onto individual users”<sup>48</sup>. In this light, dignity is made conditional not on being human, but on being compliant, optimized, and trackable. Moreover, the logic of prediction embedded in digital reproductive systems reduces complex, lived experiences to probabilistic calculations. This explains why it was described how “multi-omics prognostication tools used in digital reproductive health often function with limited interpretability, reinforcing systemic biases in access and outcomes”<sup>49</sup>. The problem is not simply technological but moral with tools that purport to assist may end up sorting and separating, undermining the core bioethical commitment to equity and care.

This tension is not limited to users but extends to reproductive laborers particularly in transnational surrogacy, sperm donation, or egg harvesting, where digital contracts and biometric registries govern labour with cold efficiency. A scholar writes that “for women in the Global South, digitalization in reproductive markets often reinforces their position as service providers rather than rights holders”<sup>50</sup>. Their bodies are tracked, measured, and commodified without the full dignity of legal recognition or healthcare equity. At the same time, digital reproductive health platforms claim to democratize access, especially in remote or underserved regions. Technology, in such cases, becomes a tool of moral stratification, not liberation. The promise of dignity is thereby contingent upon visibility, access, and compatibility with coded norms. A scholar makes this explicit noting that “constitutional guarantees of dignity in reproductive

health mean little where platform design and access are left to private actors unbound by rights-based obligations”<sup>51</sup>. Digital dignity, then, must be institutionalized not imagined. The ethical burden of bridging this divide must not fall solely on users or patients as “the full realization of reproductive rights depends on systems legal, clinical, technological that do not just protect individuals but actively support them through equity-based reforms”<sup>52</sup>. Dignity in a digital age must then mean more than protection from harm but include active support for flourishing.

### Findings and Discussion

The study brought to light critical tensions and unresolved dilemmas at the heart of genetics, reproductive health, and human dignity in the digital age. These findings, drawn from close reading and critical review of authoritative texts, reflect both the promise and the peril of innovation in human reproduction. The study found that while digital technologies in genetics and reproduction are often framed as empowering, they tend to blur the boundaries between liberation and regulation. This observation resonates throughout various applications of artificial reproductive technologies (ARTs) and gene editing tools. The expectation of reproductive success, facilitated by AI and predictive analytics, often distorts autonomy into obligation as patients are expected to “optimize” outcomes or risk being labelled negligent. In AI-enhanced reproductive platforms, dignity is often tied to visibility within data systems. This is not simply a technological oversight but a philosophical crisis, when humanity is interpreted through code and where ethical meaning is susceptible to market logic and technical exclusion. The consequence is a subtle but corrosive shift from dignity as inherent to dignity as evaluative. What the study finds troubling is the increasing cultural acceptance of such shifts, particularly in bioethical discussions that prioritize effectiveness over equity. Another significant finding is that legal and policy frameworks remain fragmented, reactive, and frequently inadequate in protecting dignity in digital reproductive health.

The consistent invocation of “human dignity” across bioethical discourse, without rigorous definition or application is also worrisome. While it functions rhetorically as a boundary-marker against unethical

innovation, it is often left unexplored in practical implementation. Digital health tools, despite their emancipatory promise, can deepen existing reproductive inequalities unless deliberately corrected through ethical design. Precision medicine, for instance, provides tailored treatment plans based on genomics, yet disproportionately reflects Euro-American genetic datasets. The rights-based lens resists both techno-utopianism and moral panic by re-centering the person not the genome, not the market, and not the algorithm. It becomes the case then that autonomy, consent, equitable access and a rights-based approach will offer a normative anchor in an otherwise fragmented ethical terrain. This is especially important in cases involving future persons such as children born through germline editing or AI-optimized embryo selection who have no say in their design but must live with its outcomes.

### Conclusion and Recommendations

The nexus of genetics, reproductive well-being, and information technologies calls for an ethical infrastructure essentially rooted in respect for human dignity. This study demonstrates that even as newer technologies hold the promise of enhancing reproductive options and diagnostic capabilities, their advancement and implementation often occur within socio-political environments that generate access inequities, commoditize human bodies, and distort personal agency in the discourse of design. A central normative finding of this research is that human dignity should be treated as a legal and institutional enforceable substantive norm in bioethics and not a superficial concern, thereby requiring legal and institutional implementation.

At a practical level, this demands that technologies respect relational dignity, not only in terms of individual autonomy, but also in how people are recognized within communities, families, and health systems. The resulting disparities in outcomes violate both dignity and justice. Therefore, future systems should incorporate co-design with diverse communities, including persons with disabilities, racial and sexual minorities, and women from the Global South. This is not a matter of corporate diversity rhetoric but of moral necessity. One of the most pressing recommendations involves data ethics. In the current reproductive tech landscape, informed consent is often reduced to blur

checkboxes which should not be so.

Policy reform must enforce transparent consent protocols enshrining the right to data withdrawal. The application of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the EU offers a model, but more targeted legislation is required in the specific context of reproductive health. These include clear provisions for privacy, secondary data use, and AI auditing mechanisms, especially when reproductive outcomes may be influenced by hidden variables with profound disparities in the ethical and legal frameworks governing reproductive and genetic technologies internationally. This is particularly important in avoiding “ethics dumping” in vulnerable jurisdictions where weaker oversight invites experimentation that would be impermissible elsewhere.

To mitigate this, international organizations such as WHO, UNESCO, and the Human Rights Council should move beyond guideline issuance to binding legal conventions. These should establish minimum ethical standards for all nations engaging in ARTs, gene editing, and AI reproductive technologies. Moreover, enforcement mechanisms and third-party monitoring bodies should ensure compliance. Also, if future clinicians, technicians, and health administrators are to uphold dignity, they must be trained to recognize ethical complexity in digital environments. This includes learning to identify and resist the dehumanization of patients through statistical reductionism. It also means teaching how to ethically counsel prospective parents without coercion, bias, or value-laden assumptions about what constitutes a ‘normal’ or ‘desirable’ child.

Technology cannot fulfil its ideals of human flourishing if it worsens existing inequalities. Policies must therefore target access equity, including the subsidization of ARTs for low-income families, rural deployment of digital reproductive tools, and linguistic/cultural localization of reproductive AI interfaces. Ensuring affordability and cultural appropriateness is not charity but justice. Moreover, platforms that provide AI-driven fertility or genome services should be required to conduct ethics impact assessments before market entry much like environmental assessments in industry. These assessments would measure the distributive, cultural, and dignity-related implications of new tech rollouts. In conclusion, the

study affirms that the digital age has not rendered dignity obsolete but has made it more essential than ever. As boundaries between body and data, life and code, desire and design blur, human dignity remains the clearest line of moral defence. Thus, human dignity must be protected not only in words, but in infrastructure, law, and lived experience.

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